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Abstract
Objectives The study of prosocial behaviour has accelerated greatly in the last 20 years. Researchers are exploring different
domains of prosocial behaviour such as compassion, kindness, caring, cooperation, empathy, sympathy, love, altruism andmorality.
While these constructs can overlap, and are sometimes used interchangeably, they also have distinctive features that require careful
elucidation. This paper discusses some of the controversies and complexities of describing different (prosocial) mental states,
followed by a study investigating the differences between two related prosocial concepts: compassion and kindness.
Methods For the study, a scenario-based questionnaire was developed to assess the degree to which a student (N = 222) and a
community (N = 112) sample judged scenarios in terms of compassion or kindness. Subsequently, participants rated emotions
(e.g. sadness, anxiety, anger, disgust, joy) associated with each scenario.
Results Both groups clearly distinguished kindness from compassion in the scenarios on the basis of suffering. In addition,
participants rated compassion-based scenarios as significantly higher on sadness, anger, anxiety and disgust, whereas kindness-
based scenarios had higher levels of joy. As a follow-up, a further sample (29male, 63 female) also rated compassionate scenarios
as involving significantly more suffering compared to the kindness scenarios.
Conclusions Although overlapping concepts, compassion and kindness are clearly understood as different processes with dif-
ferent foci, competencies and emotion textures. This has implications for research in prosocial behaviour, and the cultivation of
kindness and compassion for psychotherapy and in general.
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The last 20 years has seen a rapid increase in the conceptual-
isation and research on prosocial motivation and behaviour
(Baumsteiger and Siegel 2019; Colonnello et al. 2017;
Keltner et al. 2014). Eisenberg et al. (2016) define prosocial
behaviour as “voluntary behaviour intended to benefit anoth-
er, such as helping, donating, sharing and comforting”
(p.1688). Underpinning prosocial behaviour can be a variety
of overlapping but different concepts and processes such as
coope ra t ion (Peysakhov ich e t a l . 2014) , ca r e -
providing(Gilbert 1989/2016; Mayseless 2016), altruism
(Preston 2013), empathy (Bloom 2017), sympathy
(Eisenberg et al. 2015 ), compassion (Böckler et al. 2016;
Gilbert 2017a; Seppälä et al. 2017), basic kindness (Curry
et al. 2018; Phillips and Taylor 2009) and loving-kindness
(Hofmann et al. 2011), including directing it to oneself (Neff
and Germer 2013).
As research has progressed, the need for clarity on the use
and definitions of “prosocial” terms and processes has become
more evident (Basran et al. 2019; Baumsteiger and Siegel
2018; Gilbert 2017a). For example, at times, concepts such
as prosocial, altruism, helping, kindness, love, caring, con-
cern, compassion, empathy, sympathy and benevolence are
used interchangeably. However, this may cloud understanding
of their multiple textures, overlaps and differences and how to
cultivate them, both for oneself and within communities
(Bierhoff 2005). One problem is with language and our
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descriptive phenomenology of such mental states. A famous
historical example of this problem was the confusion of com-
passion with pity. The Western philosopher Schopenhauer
(1788–1860), who shared the Buddhist idea that life is full
of suffering, was very influenced by the Buddhist antidote to
suffering and the basis for morality and ethics was the culti-
vation of compassion. Unfortunately, Nietzsche (1844–1900)
opposed him and thought compassion was a very poor
grounding for moral behaviour or duty. The problem was with
their definitions. This was noted by Cartwright (1988): “be-
cause Schopenhauer and Nietzsche refer to two different emo-
tions by the German noun ‘Mitleid’; that it is best to under-
stand Schopenhauer’s conception of ‘Mitleid’ as ‘compas-
sion’ and Nietzsche’s as ‘pity.’” (p.1)
Resistance to the concept “compassion” remains and
comes partly from the way people and researchers define it.
Some see compassion as soft kindness, being nice, but also as
weak and self-indulgent, in a world context that demands
toughness. In a meta-analysis of fears, blocks and resistance
to compassion, Kirby et al. (2019) found fears of self-
compassion and being open to compassion from others were
highly correlated with shame, self-criticism and depression.
Basran et al. (2019) found that resistances to compassion for
others were significantly correlated with narcissism, ruthless
self-ambition and fears of inferiority. So, the words, language
and socially shared definitions we use when trying to promote
prosocial behaviours and values for ourselves, clients and so-
ciety in general matters a great deal.
One early philosopher who addressed the problem of our
shared understanding of words, meanings and mental phe-
nomenology was Socrates (399–270 BCE; Hackett 2016).
His student Plato went on to teach Aristotle who wrote on
the nature of compassion (Nussbaum 2001). Socrates devel-
oped a method of enquiry, sometimes called maieutics, the
method of elenchus, as Socratic questioning to explore how
people understand concepts and use words for conceptual
thinking. He noted that words such as honour, bravery, duty,
ethics and love could be conceptualised differently and mean
different things to different people. Only through dialogue
with exemplars and counter-exemplars could one gain insight
into how people conceptualise such different concepts
(Hackett 2016). Maieutics highlights the fact that words can
only be defined via their relationship with other words and
concepts and how they are used. This study follows this pro-
cess of using examples to elicit meaning in regard to kindness
and compassion.
There have been many variations in the suggested defini-
tion and the constituents of compassion (Gilbert 2017a) but as
an evolved care-rooted motivation, compassion has (like other
motives) a stimulus (activation-engagement) and response
(appropriate action) process. Hence, compassion can be de-
fined as sensitivity to suffering in self and others with a com-
mitment to try to alleviate and prevent it(Gilbert 2017a). The
stimulus and engagement with suffering depends upon a cer-
tain kind of courage and willingness to engage (rather than
avoid), attentional sensitivity, capacity for being emotionally
moved (sympathy), being able to be tolerant of any distress
arising, be able to make sense of that distress and need (with
empathy) and being non-judgemental. The response and
action component requires attention not to the distress, but
to the wise alleviation of the distress (e.g. a doctor pays atten-
tion to what the treatment should be), ability to run scenarios
in one’s mind (of helpfulness) and generate appropriate feel-
ings and behaviours according to the context of what is nec-
essary and helpful (Gilbert 2009, 2017b). What turns basic
(mammalian) caring into compassion is when caring is guided
by our new brain competencies of human self-awareness, in-
telligence, reasoning and meta-cognition and being be able to
predict the consequence of our behaviour and monitor our
behaviour in line with those predictions (Dunbar 2017).
Compassion is therefore caring purposely, mindfully aware,
deliberately thoughtfully and chosen (Gilbert 2009, 2017b;
Gilbert and Choden 2013).
The central core of compassion is therefore the willingness
and courage to turn towards and engage in suffering allied to
(the discovery and cultivation of) wisdom of how best to be or
act. In this type of approach, the emotions associated with
compassion are contextual. For example, a firefighter entering
a burning house to save a family could feel anxious, someone
fighting injustice could feel anger and someone consoling a
dying person, sad. Hence, they will experience very different
emotions and actions according to the context. Compassionate
behaviour can also be based on one’s moral beliefs and self-
identity rather be emotion-based (Loewenstein and Small
2007). Compassionate facial expressions also differ according
to the context and the message to be conveyed (Falconer et al.
2019). What is common to each of these domains is the
motivation to address suffering which pre-exists any specific
event.
Gilbert and Choden (2013) also noted that the prevention
of suffering is implicit in many traditions and therefore should
be added to its definition, although many Western definitions
still lack it. This means that any act which has the intention of
preventing suffering could be an example of a compassionate
act. Compassion intention would thereby extend to a whole
range of human activities like legal institutions, laws, vacci-
nations and healthy eating. Compassion can therefore give rise
to a self-identity and way of living which is following the
mindful intention in all our activities “to be helpful not harm-
ful” while recognising it’s easy for our minds to act harmfully
(Gilbert 2017b, 2018).
A different prosocial concept is kindness, although kind-
ness and compassion are often used interchangeably
(Hofmann et al. 2011). In their major meta-analysis on the
beneficial effects of behaving kindly to others on the well-
being of the provider, Curry et al. (2018) define kindness very
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simply as, “kindness refers to actions intended to benefit
others” (p.321). They then highlight that kind behaviour can
be underpinned by different motivations, including kin altru-
ism, mutualism, reciprocal altruism and competitive altruism.
Hence, if wewent with this definition, there is nothing specific
about kindness that could not be applied to many other
prosocial terms and behaviours. However, in a fMRI meta-
analysis of kind and altruistic behaviour, Cutler and
Campbell-Meiklejohn (2019) reveal that there can be different
motivations for helpful and kind behaviour linking to different
neurophysiological patterns. Evolutionists also suggest that
while people may consciously believe they are behaving with
kindly and good intention, nevertheless there may well be an
underlying, non-conscious genetic payoff.
In their historical and philosophical treatise on Kindness,
Phillips and Taylor (2009) link kindness to its root, which is
“treating others like kin”. They highlight (as Socrates would
argue) how the concept of kindness is historically connected
to complex networks of other concepts such as sympathy,
empathy, benevolence, generosity and compassion, and is
rooted in the concept of human interdependency much as
compassion is. Similarly, Ballatt and Campling (2011) titled
their important book on caring in the health service Intelligent
Kindness. They, like Phillips and Taylor (2009), link kindness
to concepts such as sympathy, generosity, highlighting the
importance of “treating others like kin” when caring for peo-
ple who are unwell and recognising the overlapping nature
with compassion. Some Buddhist and contemplative tradi-
tions distinguish four basic qualities to cultivate divine
abodes: karuṇā (compassion), metta (benevolent kindness),
mudita (sympathetic joy) and upekka (equanimity).
Although all are clearly prosocial, interdependent and support
each other, they are also different. Karuṇā is focused on the
preparedness to engage with, and wish to alleviate, suffering
in all sentient beings, whereas metta is the desire to create the
conditions for the arising of happiness and well-being is more
closely associated with kindness (Dalai Lama 1995, 2001;
Tsering 2008). So karuṇā (compassion) and metta (benevo-
lence–kindness) address different sentiments. The Dalai Lama
(2001) roots compassion and kindness in different motiva-
tions. Compassion focuses on the motive to relieve suffering,
as he indicated, “What is compassion? Compassion is the
wish that others be free of suffering. It is by means of com-
passion that we aspire to attain enlightenment. It is compas-
sion that inspires us to engage in the virtuous practices that
lead to Buddhahood. We must therefore devote ourselves to
developing compassion (p.91).”
Kindness, in contrast is much more focused on the motive
to see others flourish and be happy. Indeed, he distinguished
between these wishes, “Just as compassion is the wish that all
sentient beings be free of suffering, loving-kindness is the
wish that all may enjoy happiness (p.96)”. Kindness doesn’t
really require an analysis of suffering, but compassion does.
When we explored a sample of Western dictionaries such as
Oxford, Cambridge and Collins, we found that they defined
suffering as a state of “mental and physical pain”. The expe-
rience of pain is central. This is not the case, however, in some
Buddhist concepts of suffering which are sometimes given the
term Dukkha. While some scholars use the terms pain and
suffering interchangeably to describe Dukkha, others do not
and refer to the Sutra of the two arrows (Gilbert and Choden
2013). The first arrow creates pain; the second arrow is the
suffering that arises from our reactions to the first arrow.
Gilbert and Choden (2013) suggested a third arrow which is
when we feel ashamed of our reactions and fight with or try to
supress with our own reactions. So, Dukkha relates not to the
pain itself but our reactions, our beliefs, fears and rages to
experiencing pain. When Kabat-Zinn(1982) pioneered the in-
troduction of mindfulness for chronic pain, for whom medi-
cine could do little, the aim was to work with the emotional
reactions to pain (the second arrow) rather than pain itself (the
first arrow).
Western views of suffering, in contrast, focus on different
dimensions of these issues. For example, Sensky (2010)
highlighted how we can experience pain in a particular part
of the body, but suffering is to do with the whole person. We
say, “I have pain in my broken leg” but we don’t say “my
broken leg is suffering”; we say, “I am suffering”; suffering
is a mental state. Second, the context of pain and the causes of
pain and suffering are important. For example, our emotional
reaction to breaking a leg because we jumped in front of the
car to save somebody might feel quite different than if we did
it because we were drunk and careless or because somebody
attacked us. The context and timing of loss and pain can be
important to how it is experienced and dealt with and our
compassion for it. Breaking a leg when we are about to start
a sports career, which ends it, would be quite different than if
we are middle-aged and a well-established, desk sitting, com-
puter person. So, the physical pain of breaking a leg is the
same no matter how it was broken, but the Dukkha could be
very different. The meaning of, and implications of, pain are
important.
In the Western medical model, pain and suffering can be
seen as things to be “got rid” rather than of something “to
grow through, learn from and change”. The discovery of an-
aesthesia has been a godsend for those in physical pain, need-
ing surgery or dying of cancer. The Buddha would have been
delighted too. Indeed, the emergence of the Enlightenment in
Europe was motivated partly by reflections on the appalling
suffering of humanity and a belief that science and direct in-
tervention could improve the human condition. The “free-
dom” they sought was partly freedom from pain and suffering
(Gay 1969). So, when Western clinicians talk about being
sensitive to suffering, the focus is mostly physical and mental
pain. This is the basis of course for medicine which seeks the
actual removal of disease and the repair of injury which are
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causes of pain. This is quite different to the suffering implied
in terms of “dukkha”. Technical interventions (surgery) ad-
dress pain, psychotherapeutic one’s and contemplative tradi-
tions address Dukkha. Indeed, sometimes medical doctors are
seen as lacking compassion because although they are techni-
cally competent at addressing pain and disease, with surgery
or drugs, they may show very little interest in the patients’
feelings, reactions, fears and sadness’s as part of the condition.
Such concerns underpin the sense that there has been a loss of
compassion in health services (Trzekiak and Mazzarelli 2018)
Stated briefly then the relationship between compassion
and suffering and their mutual interdependence is more
complex than simple definitions would suggest. Sometimes,
compassion is not the alleviation or prevention of pain, but the
wise navigation into it and learning from it. Acknowledging
the limitations of our ability to deal with the inevitable
sufferings of life including its ultimate end, Feldman and
Kuyken (2011) highlight the multifaceted textures of compas-
sion in relation to suffering. They suggested “Compassion is
the acknowledgment that not all pain can be ‘fixed’ or ‘solved’
but all suffering is made more approachable in a landscape of
compassion. Compassion is a multitextured response to pain,
sorrow and anguish. It includes kindness, empathy, generosity
and acceptance. The strands of courage, tolerance, equanimity
are equally woven into the cloth of compassion. Above all,
compassion is the capacity to open to the reality of suffering
and to aspire to its healing (p. 143).”
Feldman and Kuyken (2011) also stated, “Compassion is
an orientation of mind that recognises pain and the universal-
ity of pain in human experience and the capacity to meet that
pain with kindness, empathy, equanimity and patience. While
self-compassion orients to our own experience, compassion
extends this orientation to others’ experience (p. 145).”
Compassion may often involve kindness, but kindness
does not need to include suffering and compassion. Another
core theme relating to suffering and compassion is the degree
of suffering arising from the cost of helping. In other words, to
what extent do we suffer as a result of trying to help others, be
it sacrificing and giving up something important to us or ac-
tually being prepared to experience pain, as in the case of
providing bone marrow or a kidney for a cancer victim.
Indeed, the whole concept of altruism is based on the idea that
caring and helping carry a cost and it’s the cost that determines
the degree to which it is an altruistic act (Preston 2013). While
simple definitions (like those above) are useful starting points,
if we only stop with the simple definitions these subtleties and
complexities are lost.
For this study, we therefore aimed to explore distinctions
between compassion and kindness from everyday usage of the
terms, people’s use of these concepts in relationship to specific
scenarios that differ in degree of cost, helpfulness, and suffer-
ing and sought to clarify if participants viewed the kindness
and compassion scenarios differently in terms of suffering.We
hypothesised that compassion-based scenarios would be relat-
ed to higher levels of distressing emotions such as sadness,
fear, anger and disgust and that higher self-image scores
would be associated with negative responses to these scenar-
ios. We also hypothesised that negative responses to these
scenarios would correlate with self-image goals rather than
compassionate goals.
Method
Participants
A total of 222 undergraduate students from a University in the
UK participated in the study, which consisted of 159 females
and 63 males with ages ranging from 18 to 58 years (M =
24.44, SD = 7.79). In the first part of the study, we recruited
98 undergraduate students, which included 65 females and 33
males with ages ranging from 18 to 53 years (M = 23.74, SD =
6.70). In the second part of the study, we recruited 124 stu-
dents consisting of 30 males and 94 females, with ages rang-
ing from 18–58 (M = 25.15, SD = 8.89). Students were re-
cruited through the University student pool, where they re-
ceived course credit for participation.We also recruited a com-
munity sample from Australia, which included 112 adults, 82
males and 30 females, with age range from 18–73 years with a
mean of 41.77 years (SD = 13.72). The community sample
was recruited through convenience sampling (e.g. word of
mouth, social media platforms such as Twitter and
Facebook). There were no eligibility criteria for participation
outside of being over 18 years of age and the ability to under-
stand written English. These two groups were chosen to de-
termine if there were differences between undergraduate and
community samples in how scenarios were categorised as ei-
ther compassionate or kind. The sample sizes were chosen
because we considered any effect that could not be uncovered
with this sample size to be too small to be meaningful. A final
community sample comprising 94 adults (29 male, 63 fe-
male), ages ranging from 18–50 (M = 25.67; SD = 9.19),
was also recruited to determine the level of suffering in each
of the scenarios. This community sample was also recruited
through convenience sampling (e.g. word of mouth, social
media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook).
Procedure
There were two parts to this study. The first was to determine
whether participants would discriminate between compassion
and kind scenarios. The second part was to determine whether
there was a difference in the emotional pattern, specifically in
regards to threat responses (anger, fear), between the compas-
sion and kind scenarios.We collected two independent student
samples to address these questions, as how a participant
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categorised a scenario in part 1, would influence how they
then rated the emotions they would experience in each scenar-
io in part 2. All procedures received approval by the respective
ethical bodies, including the Psychology Research Ethics
Committee at the University of Derby, and the School of
Psychology Research Ethics Committee at the University of
Queensland. All measures were completed either on paper or
online. The only demographic data collected was gender and
age. All research participants who wished to participate were
provided an information sheet with an explanation of what the
study involved, and they all confirmed they had read and
understood this and provided informed consent by completing
the consent form.
Measures
Kindness and Compassion Scenarios Scale
Clinical work with compassion-focused therapy
(CFT)(Gilbert 2000, 2010, 2014; Gilbert and Choden 2013)
suggests that kindness training is different to compassion
training, partly because compassion involves more attention
to suffering and more therapeutic training in competencies
such as empathy, sympathy and distress tolerance compared
to kindness. During one CFT training workshop, participants
were asked to think of examples they would describe as kind
and others they would describe as compassionate. From those
examples provided, the research team then developed 18 sce-
narios in order to potentially discriminate these two prosocial
constructs. Specifically, the authors originally generated a
number of scenarios that were informed by the evolutionary
approach (Gilbert 2009; Gilbert and Choden 2013) and the
Dalai Lama’s (2001, p 96) definition of compassion (focus
on suffering) and kindness (focus on well-being) and the ex-
amples provided by the CFT workshop participants.
Discussion were had amongst the authors regarding all gener-
ated items and 18 scenarios were selected with 10 of the sce-
narios representing kindness and eight representing compas-
sion. This was called the Kindness and Compassion Scenarios
Scale. An example a scenario is, “Doing a favour for some-
body that takes up your time.” See Table 1 for all 18 scenarios.
Under each scenario, the participant had to categorise it as
either, “I think this scenario is better described as being a
kind scenario” or “I think this scenario is better described as
being a compassionate scenario”.
The Emotions of Kindness and Compassion Scale
The Emotions of Kindness and Compassion Scale was devel-
oped for this study to assess if different emotions are associ-
ated with the compassion and kindness scenarios. To assess
this, participants were asked to rate on a 9-point scale from 1
(not at all) to 9 (very much) the following in regards to each
scenario: typical of me, meaningful, sadness, anxiety, anger,
disgust and joy. Participants were instructed that, “When peo-
ple are motivated to help others, they can experience different
emotions depending on what is required in the helping activ-
ity. Read each statement carefully and rate the extent to which
you would feel each emotion if you were to engage in this
activity.” This was done for all 18 scenarios described in the
Kindness and Compassion Scenarios Scale. The Cronbach
alpha values for the kindness scenarios and compassion sce-
narios ranged from acceptable to excellent for each of the
outcomes: typical (α = .80; α = .79), meaningful (α = .87, α
= .82), sadness (α = .87, α = .79), anxiety (α = .85, α = .84),
anger (α = .86,α = .86), disgust (α = .80,α = .79) and joy (α =
.84; α = .65).
Negative Responses to Kindness and Compassion Scale
We also had negative responses to the kindness and compas-
sion scenarios scale. Participants were asked six questions
about possible responses to the scenarios. These included (1)
to what extendwould you feel guilty if you didn’t do them; (2)
to what extent would you feel irritated if you were asked to do
them; (3) to what extent do you think you do things for other
people to avoid feeling guilty; (4) to what extent do you do
things to help other people to get them to like you; (5) to what
extent do you feel resentful at the expectations that we should
help others; and (6) to what extent do you feel there is too big
an expectation on us to help others. Participants had to re-
spond to each of these responses on 9-point scale from 1
(not at all) to 9 (very much).
Compassionate and Self-Image Goals Scale
The Compassionate and Self-Image Goals Scale (Crocker and
Canevello 2008) measures compassionate goals and self-
image goals on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 5
(extremely). Self-image goals involve strategic self-
presentations and social fears and avoid acting in ways that
might solicit criticism or rejection. Compassionate goals focus
on supporting others, and caring for the well-being of others.
The measure has been shown to have good reliability, internal
consistency, and validity (Crocker and Canevello 2008). In
our sample, the Cronbach alphas for the compassions scale
was α = .75, and for the self-image scale α = .78.
Level of Suffering
Given the idea that suffering is a key distinguishing factor
between kindness and compassion, we also asked partici-
pants to rate the level of suffering in each of the scenarios.
Specifically, we asked, “We are interested in your views
on how much suffering there is in different scenarios. So
in each of the scenarios below please rate how much
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suffering would be involved in each of these acts of help-
ing.” Participants had to respond to each of these scenar-
ios on a 10-point scale from 1 (no suffering) to 10 (very
high levels of suffering).
Data Analyses
We conducted a series of goodness of fit-chi squares to
determine whether there were any significant differences
between how the scenarios were categorised. We then
conducted a series of repeated measures t tests to deter-
mine whether the emotional pattern for each scenario
differed between compassion and kind-based scenarios.
Finally, we then conduced bi-variate correlations to de-
termine the strength of relationship between self-image
goals and compassionate goals with negative reactions
to the prosocial scenarios. We also examined in a mul-
tivariate analysis of variance whether there were signif-
icant differences between the UK student sample and
Australian community sample in regard to the negative
Table 1 Chi-square goodness of fit results for the distribution of endorsement of kindness or compassion for the prosocial scenarios
Prosocial scenario UK undergraduate sample Australian community sample
Kindness
(n)
Compassion
(n)
Chi-Square Kindness
(n)
Compassion
(n)
Chi-Square
Doing a favour for somebody that takes up your time 93 4 81.660, p <
.001
87 23 37.236, p <
.001
Giving up your evening to baby-sit so that another person can
go out instead of you
78 20 34.327, p <
.001
78 30 21.333, p <
.001
Giving away your last bit of money to help a homeless person,
meaning you can’t catch the bus and will need to walk 20 min
to get home
23 75 27.592, p <
.001
24 86 34.945, p <
.001
Donate a kidney to save a friend 22 75 28.959, p <
.001
20 90 44.545, p <
.001
Giving up your time to support a friend at the funeral of a loved
parent
25 73 23.510, p <
.001
7 103 83.782, p <
.001
Trying to console someone in distress 23 75 27.592, p <
.001
13 96 63.202 p <
.001
Mentoring somebody to achieve their career goals 73 24 24.753, p <
.001
81 29 24.582, p <
.001
Helping somebody whose car has broken down and knowing
you will get dirty in helping
73 24 24.753, p <
.001
62 48 1.782, p =
.182
Despite not liking needles, donating your blood to help save the
lives of others
30 67 14.113, p <
.001
29 81 24.582, p <
.001
Saving your money to buy a present for someone that you know
they always wanted
79 18 38.361, p <
.001
92 18 49.782, p <
.001
Buying a present for somebody to show you appreciate the
friendship
79 18 38.361, p <
.001
100 10 73.636, p <
.001
Listening to a colleague you don’t like because they are struggling
with work stress
50 47 .093, p =
.761
12 98 67.236, p <
.001
Genuinely asking the storekeeper how their day is going 76 21 31.186, p <
.001
68 42 6.145, p =
.013
Stepping in and trying to do something when you see somebody be
racially verbally abused
29 68 15.680, p <
.001
9 101 76.945, p <
.001
Stopping and helping somebody who has been injured or hurt on the
side of the road
31 67 13.224, p <
.001
22 88 39.600, p <
.001
Remembering to call your friend to wish them a happy birthday 85 13 52.898, p <
.001
92 18 49.782, p <
.001
Baking cakes for colleagues at work 94 3 85.371, p <
.001
107 3 98.327, p <
.001
Offering your spare tickets to a show to somebody 86 12 55.878, p <
.001
107 3 98.327, p <
.001
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reactions to prosocial scenarios. Finally, we examined
using a paired sample t tests the differences in suffering
for each of the 18 scenarios.
Results
Goodness of fit chi-squares were conducted as we did not
have a priori expectation values that could be set. We wanted
to leave it open such that the scenarios had equal chance of
being selected by participants given that kindness and com-
passion are often used interchangeably. Based on the results,
however, it was clear that students clearly distinguished sce-
narios in regard to compassionate or kind behaviour. The only
exception was for, Listening to a colleague you don’t like
because they are struggling with work stress, which was
non-significant, χ (1, n = 99) = .093, p = .761. Once again,
this issue of liking–disliking seems to be an important dimen-
sion requiring further research. These results give a clear in-
dication that students distinguish kindness from compassion,
with the level of suffering being a key dimension of difference
between the kind and compassion scenarios. However, in the
non-student Australian sample, the Listening to a colleague
you don’t like because they are struggling with work stress,
was significant,χ (1, n = 112) = 67.236, p = .001, andHelping
somebody whose car has broken down and knowing you will
get dirty in helping was non-significant, χ (1, n = 112) =
1.782, p = .182. These results indicate there are subtle differ-
ences between students and (older) community samples in
how scenarios are categorised, which might be due to who
individuals are and what they have been exposed to on a daily
basis.
In the second part of the study, the emotional responses to
the compassion and kindness scenarios were averaged. Then a
series of pairwise t tests were conducted to determine if the
emotional responses to the scenarios significantly differed.
Based on the results, as seen in Table 2, all emotional re-
sponses differed, with greater levels of sadness, anxiety, anger
and disgust experienced in the compassion scenarios com-
pared to the kindness. Moreover, greater levels of joy were
experienced in the kindness scenarios. The compassion sce-
narios were seen as more meaningful, and there was no dif-
ference in terms of whether the scenario was typical of the
individual or not. The exact findings were found for both the
university and community samples.
We then examined goal orientation to see if there were
differences on the sample, with a MANOVA finding a signif-
icant multivariate interaction, F(2, 211) = 3.063, p < .049, η2 =
.028. Univariate effects found no significant differences be-
tween the groups; see Table 3.
Following this, we then conduced bi-variate correlations to
determine the strength of relationship between self-image
goals and compassionate goals with negative reactions to the
prosocial scenarios. See Table 4 below where we found that
self-image goals were correlated significantly with negative
reactions, whereas compassionate goals were negatively asso-
ciated with negative responses. This was true for both the
undergraduate and community samples.
We conducted a multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) to determine whether our samples (student vs.
community) significantly differed in their negative reactions
to the prosocial scenarios (guilt, irritation, avoid guilt, to like
you, resentful and expectation); see Table 5. The MANOVA
revealed a significant multivariate interaction, F(2, 207) =
4.685, η2 = .12. Significant univariate effects were found for
the negative reactions of doing things for other people to avoid
feeling guilty, F(1,208) = 18.197, p < .001, η2 = .079 and
feeling resentful at the expectations that we should help
others, F(1,208) = 14.633, p < .001, η2 = .065. Feeling irri-
tated if you were asked to do the prosocial behaviours was
also significant, F(1,208) = 4.727, p = .031, η2 = .022, but
when applying Bonferroni correction to control for Type II
error, it was no longer significant. These results seem to sug-
gest that with age, individuals engage in prosocial behaviour
for less negative reasons.
Finally, we also examined whether individuals would rate
the compassion scenarios to have higher levels of suffering
compared to the kindness scenarios. A paired-samplet test
found that on average the compassion scenarios (M = 3.6;
SD = 1.49) had significantly higher levels of suffering than
the kindness scenarios (M = 1.92; SD = 0.95), t(93) = 12.614,
p < .001. In Table 6, all 18 scenarios are ranked from scenarios
with the most suffering to least suffering, with the compassion
scenarios being rated higher on suffering to the kindness
scenarios.
Discussion
Our results indicate that individuals naturally distinguish be-
tween kindness and compassion. The key to the distinction is
indeed the degree and form of suffering included within each
scenario, as evidenced in the higher scores of suffering in the
compassion compared to the kindness scenarios. So our data
highlights the fact that compassion is indeed thought of dif-
ferently to kindness (Baránková et al. 2019; Dalai Lama 1995,
2001; Strauss et al. 2016).When helpful acts are aimed to
reduce or ameliorate suffering, people are more likely to con-
ceptualise them as compassionate acts (Feldman and Kuyken
2011). Importantly, not only do individuals distinguish be-
tween kindness and compassionate behaviours, but they
ascribe significantly different emotional patterns to them as
well. This supports the Dalai Lama (2001) as compassion
being focused primarily to alleviate suffering and the causes
of suffering and kindness is to create the conditions for hap-
piness and flourishing. Few emotion theorists see compassion
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as a specific emotion (Ekman 2016). Our data supports this in
that compassion is not linked to any specific emotion or af-
fective state but can give rise to different emotional experi-
ences and textures experienced according to the context
(Falconer et al. 2019). It is likely that patterns of emotions will
also pertain to different contexts, as for example contexts that
require exposure to danger versus consoling.
Given that research is showing that training in empathy,
mindfulness and compassion have different neurophysiologi-
cal effects (Valk et al. 2017); it is likely that underpinning
emotional variations between kindness and compassion will
have different neurophysiological effects too. Research has
also shown that the motivations underpinning helping behav-
iours (altruistic versus strategic) do have different neurophys-
iological signatures (Cutler and Campbell-Meiklejohn2019).
This has implications for therapy and personal development
training in general. Loving-kindness is an important practice
with a range of benefits (Mascaro et al. 2015). Nonetheless,
kindness does not capture clearly the core elements of com-
passion which are courage, dedication and wisdom
(Dalai Lama 2001; Gilbert and Choden 2013). As of today,
there has been no neurophysiological study on these dimen-
sions of compassion. In addition, there is no study comparing
(loving) kindness training with compassion training, and none
that control for differences in motivation underpinning
kindness and compassion. Kirby and Baldwin (2018) ran a
randomised micro-trial study looking at loving-kindness prac-
tices to help parents with difficult child behavioural problems.
Although loving-kindness was able to reduce the intensity of
emotional experience when dealing with child problem be-
haviour, these positive findings did not occur when the parent
had elevated fears of compassion. Similarly, Kirby and
Laczko (2017) explored loving-kindness meditation in adoles-
cents living at home with their parents and found a range of
positive benefits, although again these did not occur when the
young adult had fears of compassion. It is possible, though yet
to be tested, that this is because for people with fears of com-
passion, engagement in compassion activates personal distress
rather than genuine compassion motivation. This is an issue
well-articulated in the literature (Eisenberg et al. 2015).
This raises the issue of the link between kindness and com-
passion training and particularly the potential role of fears,
blocks and resistances to them (Gilbert and Mascaro 2017).
Indeed, specific interventions may be required for people who
have elevated fears and are easily overwhelmed by kindness
or compassion interventions. In fact, it is the fears, blocks and
resistances that compassion focused therapy specifically ad-
dresses (Gilbert 2005, 2010; Kirby et al. 2019). Future re-
search could use scenarios such as these but change the con-
text. Being overwhelmed or personally distressed by the
Table 2 The emotional experiences for kindness and compassion scenarios for the UK sample
UK undergraduate sample Australian community sample
Kindness
N = 112
Compassion
N = 112
t value p Kindness
N = 124
Compassion
N = 124
t value p
Typical 6.61 (1.17) 6.51 (1.24) 1.045 .299 6.67 (1.47) 6.87 (1.35) − 1.938 .055
Meaningful 6.25 (1.39) 6.96 (1.26) − 5.335 < .001 6.67 (1.53) 7.28 (1.22) − 6.362 < .001
Sadness 1.40 (.89) 3.96 (1.51) − 18.153 < .001 2.03 (1.00) 3.96 (1.49) − 16.440 < .001
Anxiety 2.48 (1.54) 4.36 (1.87) − 14.847 < .001 2.74 (1.45) 4.36 (1.92) − 12.820 < .001
Anger 1.28 (.58) 2.16 (.88) − 12.786 < .001 1.60 (.82) 2.35 (1.17) − 10.3220 < .001
Disgust 1.18 (.52) 2.03 (.71) − 13.428 < .001 1.40 (.65) 2.00 (.90) − 8.932 < .001
Joyful 5.72 (1.37) 3.21 (1.40) 18.927 < .001 6.16 (1.53) 4.56 (1.64) 9.957 < .001
Table 3 Differences in goal orientation depending on student versus community sample
UK student sample Australian community sample Univariate ANOVA results
M SD N M SD N F p
Goal orientation
Self-image goals 16.36 4.51 109 15.29 5.11 105 2.432 .120
Compassionate goals 25.16 4.46 109 26.10 4.44 105 2.601 .108
F = ANOVA univariate interaction effect
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suffering of another can create avoidance or dissociation
(Eisenberg et al. 2015). However, this is unlikely to be the
case for kindness, since it is not focused on suffering.
Barriers pertain to both kindness and compassion. For
example, in an fMRI Hein et al. (2010) studied circuits asso-
ciated with empathy while watching someone in (mild hand
prick) pain. These circuits were less active if they were
watching somebody who had previously been seen cheating
or someone identified as belonging to a different group (foot-
ball team). Importantly too in political debates, individuals
from the general public have spoken about their dislike of
“being made to feel guilty for not caring enough for the less
fortunate” and a sense of “anger when politicians try to induce
caring and compassion by inducing guilt”, as seems to be the
case on the caring and support for immigrants; or trying to
entice the rich to take a greater sense of responsibility for the
poor (Kagan 2018). It may make a big difference to people’s
preparedness to act with genuine kindness and/or compassion
if they feel they are voluntarily choosing, rather than feeling
that they should do it because it’s expected of them (Catarino
et al. 2014). In this regard, we wondered if resentment would
relate to different kinds of motivation, particularly individuals
who were more self-focused as measured by self-image goals
versus compassion goals. Generally speaking, these do not
seem to be a distinguishing factor, but it’s clear that individ-
uals can feel resentful when it comes to acting compassion-
ately or kindly if they feel expected or obligated to rather than
freely choosing to. In addition, our results suggest that as one
ages the negative reactions of avoiding guilt and feeling re-
sentful to act prosocially changes. Our student samples were
in their early twenties, whereas our community sample was on
average 41.77 years. It is possible with age and life experi-
ences; prosociality is viewed differently.
Interestingly, in terms of amount of suffering, the highest
score was for donating a kidney to save a friend, which was
6.68 out of 10, with the majority of the other scenarios scoring
Table 4 Correlations between prosocial scenarios and negative responses
UK undergraduate sample Australian community sample
Negative reaction to prosocial scenario Mean
(SD)
Compassionate
goal
Self-image
goal
Mean
(SD)
Compassionate
goal
Self-image
goal
To what extent would you feel guilty if you didn’t do them 6.15
(2.14)
.144** .235** 5.63
(2.39)
0.08 .396**
To what extent would you feel irritated if you were asked to do
them
3.95
(2.04)
− .289** .277* 3.38
(1.81)
− .193* .298**
To what extent do you think you do things for other people to
avoid feeling guilty
5.39
(2.22)
− -0.099 .209** 4.10
(2.18)
− 0.141 .286**
To what extent do you do things to help other people to get them
to like you
4.46
(2.23)
− 0.03 .297** 4.11
(2.16)
− 0.012 .410**
To what extent do you feel resentful at the expectations that we
should help others
3.47
(2.31)
− .252** .198** 2.42
(1.68)
− .258** .272**
To what extent do you feel there is too big an expectation on us to
help others
3.86
(2.47)
− 160* .185** 3.31
(2.20)
− 0.092 .239*
*p < .05, **p < .01
Table 5 Differences in negative reactions depending on student versus community sample
UK student
sample
Australian community
sample
Univariate ANOVA
results
M SD N M SD N F p
Negative reactions
To what extent would you feel guilty if you didn’t do them 6.15 2.14 106 5.63 2.39 108 2.831 .094
To what extent would you feel irritated if you were asked to do them 3.95 2.04 106 3.38 1.81 108 4.727 .031*
To what extent do you think you do things for other people to avoid feeling guilty 5.39 2.20 106 4.10 2.19 108 18.197 < .001***
To what extent do you do things to help other people to get them to like you 4.46 2.23 106 4.11 2.16 108 1.370 .243
To what extent do you feel resentful at the expectations that we should help others 3.47 2.31 106 2.94 2.08 108 14.633 < .001***
To what extent do you feel there is too big an expectation on us to help others 3.86 2.47 106 3.31 2.35 108 2.899 090
F = ANOVA univariate interaction effect
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001
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three or below. These results indicate that many of the scenar-
ios were not considered to be high levels of suffering. These
results also raise the issue of what would be needed for some-
body to rate a scenario as a 10 out of 10 for suffering, given the
donating a kidney to save a life only scored 6.68? It could be
that many were considering the scenarios from a consequen-
tialist point of view and could also see the reduction of suffer-
ing that was occurring by engaging in the action, thus the
lower scores. It could also be that given the actions were
meaningful this buffered the level of suffering being experi-
enced.Moreover, it is important to determine what is meant by
suffering, particularly in relation to other near terms like pain
or distress (as discussed above).
Although from research and conceptual point of view
it’s important to distinguish these different qualities of
prosocial motivation and behaviour, it’s essential to rec-
ognise that all the prosocial attributes are essential in
compassionate mind trainings and therapies. For example,
this includes shared feelings of kindness, gentleness,
warmth, sadness and humour and facilitating playfulness
and taking (sympathetic) joy in the success of one’s client.
Building a compassionate therapeutic relationship can in-
volve attachment dynamics of offering a secure base and
safe haven that encourage exploration, along with empa-
thy competencies. All of these aim to reduce suffering
and enable a client to mature, grow and flourish. In the
compassion therapies, this growth will also extend to
becoming more compassionate to others and developing
an ethical and prosocial grounding for living (Gilbert
2019). What we would not wish to see is kindness being
played off against compassion, or ideas that compassion
therapies don’t focus on kindness. Compassion training
does not just address suffering but promotes moral behav-
iour, eudemonic happiness (happiness from engaging in
meaningful activities) and well-being in a way that is
different with the concept of kindness.
We also drew attention to the value of distinguishing
different mot ivat ional sys tems in therapy and
distinguishing them from feelings (Gilbert 2019). For
example, depressed mothers can struggle to have feel-
ings for their children. Indeed, the loss of feeling for
their children can drive shame and the depression, par-
ticularly for postnatally depressed mothers. For de-
pressed people who have become anhedonic, trying to
help them feel some of the more positive emotions as-
sociated with kindness (as indicated in our study) can
be counter-productive and can make them feel worse
especially if they try and fail. Indeed, as our study
shows engaging with compassion can activate distress
states (see also Condon and Barrett 2013). Hence com-
passion therapies first focus on small compassionate be-
haviors. This study has had a relatively narrow focus
and compassion and kindness may differ along dimen-
sions of courage, perseverance, determination, distress
Table 6 Rank ordering from highest level of suffering to lowest for each scenario
Scenario Prosocial
categorisation
Level of suffering (1–
10) (n = 94)
1. Donate a kidney to save a friend Compassion 6.68 (SD = 2.70)
2. Stepping in and trying to do something when you see somebody be racially verbally abused Compassion 3.78 (SD = 2.27)
3. Despite not liking needles, donating your blood to help save the lives of others Compassion 3.58 (SD = 2.09)
4. Giving away your last bit of money to help a homeless person, meaning you can't catch the bus and will
need to walk 20 min to get home
Compassion 3.48 (SD = 2.09)
5. Listening to a colleague you don’t like because they are struggling with work stress Compassion 3.33 (SD = 1.82)
6. Stopping and helping somebody who has been injured or hurt on the side of the road Compassion 2.82 (SD = 2.18)
7. Giving up your evening to baby-sit so that another person can go out instead of you Kindness 2.69 (SD = 1.59)
8. Trying to console someone in distress Compassion 2.60 (SD = 1.93)
9. Helping somebody whose car has broken down and knowing you will get dirty in helping Kindness 2.55 (SD = 1.59)
10. Giving up your time to support a friend at the funeral of a loved parent Compassion 2.55 (SD = 2.03)
11. Doing a favour for somebody that takes up your time Kindness 2.35 (SD = 1.32)
12. Baking cakes for colleagues at work Kindness 2.27 (SD = 1.54)
13. Mentoring somebody to achieve their career goals Kindness 1.87 (SD = 1.20)
14. Saving your money to buy a present for someone that you know they always wanted Kindness 1.82 (SD = 1.26)
15. Offering your spare tickets to a show to somebody Kindness 1.61 (SD = 1.57)
16. Buying a present for somebody to show you appreciate the friendship Kindness 1.40 (SD = 1.03)
17. Remembering to call your friend to wish them a happy birthday Kindness 1.38 (SD = 1.00)
18. Genuinely asking the storekeeper how their day is going Kindness 1.25 (SD = .94)
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tolerance, moral focus and others not measured here.
These dimensions of compassion are less well
recognised amongst the general public who are more
likely to see compassion as soft, gentle and tender, rath-
er than courageousness, toughness, dedication and
wisdom. Perhaps one of our biggest challenges, in en-
abling business and politics to become more interested
in compassion, is to increase awareness of the courage,
determination and morality that sits at the heart of com-
passion (Gilbert 2009, 2018).
Limitations and Future Research Directions
Limitations in the study include (a) the reliance on self-report
cross sectional data, (b) the studies relying on undergraduate
samples, as well as convenience sampling, thus limiting gen-
eralisation of the findings, (c) lack of demographic back-
ground information obtained to determine systematic differ-
ences in terms of ethnicity, culture, financial status and rela-
tionship status, and (d) the results being open to possible so-
cial desirability responding. Moreover, although we gained
input into the development of the compassion and kind sce-
narios, how these were constructed was based on the informed
views of the study authors. Further testing of these scenarios
with other psychometrically valid prosocial measures would
be useful to determine their validity. Subsequent research
could explore differences between self-conscious emotion
such as shame, guilt and pride and also the degree to which
individuals behave as a moral reasoning, rather than other
motivation (Loewenstein and Small 2007).
Finally, we note that we cannot guarantee that partic-
ipants had clarity on whether we were asking about
suffering in the target person/group experiencing versus
how much suffering would there be for themselves as
the person doing the compassionate act. Such might
shed more light on how compassion and kindness are
different. For example, suffering might be higher for the
target than for the self for compassion, but higher for
the self than for the target in relation to kindness.
Despite limitations, this study provides initial evidence that
individuals do discriminate between kindness and compas-
sion, and the emotional pattern that emerges for each differs.
In other words, although overlapping, kindness and compas-
sion should be viewed as different and this has implications
for future research, mind training and psychotherapy.
Acknowledgements We are very grateful to two reviewers for some very
thoughtful reviews on an earlier draft and highlighting the importance of
going into more detail on the nature of compassion and suffering.
Author Contributions PG, JK and JB were involved in all aspects of the
study. MM collected and inputted the data into databases.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of Interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of
interest.
Ethical Approval All procedures performed in the studies involving hu-
man participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the
Psychology Research Ethics Committee at the University of Derby, and
the School of PsychologyResearch Ethics Committee at the University of
Queensland and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amend-
ments or comparable ethical standards.
Informed consent Informed consent was obtained from all individual
participants included in the study.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons At t r ibut ion 4 .0 In te rna t ional License (h t tp : / /
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appro-
priate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Ballatt, J., & Campling, P. (2011). Intelligent kindness: Reforming the
culture of healthcare. London: Royal College of Psychiatrists
Publications.
Baránková, M., Halamová, J., & Koróniová, J. (2019). Non-expert views
of compassion: consensual qualitative research using focus groups.
Human Affairs, 29, 6–19.
Basran, J., Pires, C., Matos, M., McEwan, K., & Gilbert, P. (2019). Styles
of leadership, fears of compassion, and competing to avoid inferior-
ity. Frontiers in Psychology., 9, 2460. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.
2018.02460.
Baumsteiger, R., & Siegel, J. T. (2019). Measuring prosociality: The
development of a prosocial behavioral intentions scale. Journal of
Personality Assessment, 101(3), 305-314.
Bierhoff, H. W. (2005). The psychology of compassion and prosocial
behaviour. In P. Gilbert (Ed.), Compassion: Conceptualisations, re-
search and use in psychotherapy (pp. 148–167). London:
Routledge.
Bloom, P. (2017). Against empathy: The case for rational compassion.
New York: Random House.
Böckler, A., Tusche, A., & Singer, T. (2016). The structure of human
prosociality: differentiating altruistically motivated, norm motivat-
ed, strategically motivated, and self-reported prosocial behavior.
Social Psychological and Personality Science, 7(6), 530–541.
Cartwright, D. E. (1988). Schopenhauer’s compassion and Nietzsche’s
pity. Schopenhauer Jahrbuch, 69, 557–567http://www.
schopenhauer.philosophie.uni-mainz.de/Aufsaetze_Jahrbuch/69_
1988/Cartwright.pdf.
Catarino, F., Gilbert, P., McEwan, K., & Baião, R. (2014). Compassion
motivations: distinguishing submissive compassion from genuine
compassion and its association with shame, submissive behaviour,
Mindfulness
depression, anxiety and stress. Journal of Social and Clinical
Psychology, 33, 399–412.
Colonnello, V., Petrocchi, N., & Heinrichs, M. (2017). The psychobio-
logical foundation of prosocial relationships: the role of oxytocin in
daily social exchanges. In P. Gilbert (Ed.), Compassion: concepts,
research and applications (pp. 105–119). London: Routledge.
Condon, P., & Barrett, L. F. (2013). Conceptualizing and experiencing
compassion. Emotion, 13, 817–821.
Crocker, J., & Canevello, A. (2008). Creating and undermining social
support in communal relationships: the role of compassionate and
self-image goals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
95(3), 555–575.
Curry, O. S., Rowland, L. A., Van Lissa, C. J., Zlotowitz, S., McAlaney,
J., & Whitehouse, H. (2018). Happy to help? A systematic review
and meta-analysis of the effects of performing acts of kindness on
the well-being of the actor. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 76, 320–329.
Cutler, J., & Campbell-Meiklejohn, D. (2019). A comparative fMRI
meta-analysis of altruistic and strategic decisions to give.
Neuroimage, 184, 227–241.
Dalai Lama, D. (1995). The power of compassion. London: Thorsons.
Dalai Lama, D. (2001). An open heart. London: Hodder and Stoughton.
Dunbar, R. I. M. (2017). Human evolution: A pelican introduction.
London: Penguin UK.
Eisenberg, N., VanSchyndel, S. K., & Hofer, C. (2015). The association
of maternal socialization in childhood and adolescence with adult
offsprings’ sympathy/caring. Developmental Psychology, 51, 7–16.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0038137.
Eisenberg, N., VanSchyndel, S. K., & Spinrad, T. L. (2016). Prosocial
motivation: inferences from an opaque body of work. Child
Development, 87(6), 1668–1678.
Ekman, P. (2016). What scientists who study emotion agree about.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11, 31–34.
Falconer, C. J., Lobmaier, J. S., Christoforou, M., Kamboj, S. K., King, J.
A., Gilbert, P., & Brewin, C. R. (2019). Compassionate faces: evi-
dence for distinctive facial expressions associated with specific
prosocial motivations. PloS one, 14(1), e0210283.
Feldman, C., & Kuyken, W. (2011). Compassion in the landscape of
suffering. Contemporary Buddhism, 12, 143–155. https://doi.org/
10.1080/14639947.2011.564831.
Gay, P. (1969). The Enlightenment: The science of freedom (Vol. 2). New
York: Random House Inc.
Gilbert, P. (1989/2016). Human nature and suffering. Hove: Psychology
Press.
Gilbert, P. (2000). Social mentalities: Internal ‘social’ conflicts and the
role of inner warmth and compassion in cognitive therapy. In P.
Gilbert & K. G. Bailey (Eds.), Genes on the couch: Explorations
in evolutionary psychotherapy (pp. 118–150). Hove: Psychology
Press.
Gilbert, P. (2005). Compassion: Conceptualisations, research and use in
psychotherapy. London: Routledge.
Gilbert, P. (2009). The compassionate mind: A new approach to the
challenge of life. London: Constable & Robinson.
Gilbert, P. (2010). Compassion focused therapy. London: Routledge.
Gilbert, P. (2014). The origins and nature of compassion focused therapy.
British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 53, 6–41. https://doi.org/10.
1111/bjc.12043.
Gilbert, P. (2017a). Compassion: definitions and controversies. In P.
Gilbert (Ed.), Compassion: concepts, research and applications
(pp. 3–15). London: Routledge.
Gilbert, P. (2017b). Compassion as a social mentality. In P. Gilbert (Ed.),
Compassion: concepts, research and applications (pp. 31–68).
London: Routledge.
Gilbert, P. (2018). Living like crazy. New York: Annwyn House.
Gilbert, P. (2019). Psychotherapy for the 21st century: an integrative,
evolutionary, contextual, biopsychosocial approach. Psychology
and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice., 92, 164–189.
https://doi.org/10.1111/papt.12226.
Gilbert, P., & Choden. (2013). Mindful compassion. London: Constable
& Robinson.
Gilbert, P., & Mascaro, J. (2017). Compassion, fears, blocks and resis-
tances: An evolutionary investigation. In E. M. Seppälä et al. (Eds.),
The oxford handbook of compassion science (pp. 399–420). Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Hackett, W. (2016). Socrates: The best of Socrates: the founding philos-
ophies of ethics, virtues & life. London: Socrates Philosophy.
Hein, G., Silani, G., Preuschoff, K., Batson, C. D., & Singer, T. (2010).
Neural responses to ingroup and outgroup members’ suffering pre-
dict individual differences in costly helping. Neuron, 68, 149–160.
Hofmann, S. G., Grossman, P., & Hinton, D. E. (2011). Loving-kindness
and compassion meditation: potential for psychological interven-
tions. Clinical Psychology Review, 31(7), 1126–1132. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.cpr.2011.07.003.
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1982). An outpatient program in behavioral medicine for
chronic pain patients based on the practice of mindfulness medita-
tion: theoretical considerations and preliminary results.General hos-
pital psychiatry, 4(1), 33–47.
Kagan, J. (2018). Three unresolved issues in human morality.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 13, 346–358. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1745691617727862/.
Keltner, D., Kogan, A., Piff, P. K., & Saturn, S. R. (2014). The sociocul-
tural appraisals, values, and emotions (SAVE) framework of
prosociality: core processes from gene to meme. The Annual
Review of Psychology, 65, 425–460. https://doi.org/10.1146/
annurev-psych-010213-115054.
Kirby, J. N., & Baldwin, S. (2018). A randomized micro-trial of a loving-
kindness meditation to help parents respond to difficult child behav-
ior vignettes. Journal of Child and Family Studies, 27(5), 1614-
1628.
Kirby, J., & Gilbert, P. (2017). The emergence of the compassion focused
therapies. In P. Gilbert (Ed.), Compassion: concepts, research and
applications (pp. 258–285). London: Routledge.
Kirby, J. N., & Laczko, D. (2017). A randomized micro-trial of a loving-
kindness meditation for young adults living at home with their par-
ents. Journal of Child and Family Studies, 26, 1888–1899.
Kirby, J. N., Day, J., & Sagar, V. (2019). The ‘flow’ of compassion: a
meta-analysis of the fears of compassion scales and psychological
functioning. Clinical Psychological Review, 70, 26–39. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.cpr.2019.03.001.
Loewenstein, G., & Small, D. A. (2007). The scarecrow and the tin man:
the vicissitudes of human sympathy and caring. Review of General
Psychology, 11, 112–126. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.11.2.
112.
Mascaro, J. S., Darcher, A., Negi, L. T., & Raison, C. L. (2015). The
neural mediators of kindness-based meditation: a theoretical model.
Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 109.
Mayseless, O. (2016). The caring motivation: An integrated theory.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Neff, K. D., & Germer, C. K. (2013). A pilot study and randomized
controlled trial of the mindful self-compassion program. Journal
of Clinical Psychology, 69(1), 28–44.
Mindfulness
Nussbaum, M. C. (2001). Upheavals of thought: The intelligence of
emotion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Peysakhovich, A., Nowak,M. A., &Rand, D. G. (2014). Humans display
a ‘cooperative phenotype’ that is domain general and temporally
stable. Nature Communications, 5, 4939.
Phillips, A., & Taylor, B. (2009). On kindness. London: Hamish Books.
Preston, S. D. (2013). The origins of altruism in offspring care.
Psychological Bulletin., 139, 1305–1341.
Sensky, T. (2010). Suffering. International Journal of Integrated Care,
10, 66–68.
Seppälä, E. M., Simon-Thomas, E., Brown, S. L., Worline, M. C.,
Cameron, C. D., & Doty, J. R. (Eds.). (2017). The Oxford handbook
of compassion science. New York: Oxford University Press.
Strauss, C., Lever Taylor, B., Gu, J., Kuyken, W., Baer, R., Jones, F., &
Cavanagh, K. (2016). What is compassion and how can we measure
it? A review of definitions and measures. Clinical Psychology
Review, 47, 15–27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2016.05.004.
Trzekiak, S., &Mazzarelli, A. (2018).Compassionomics: The revolution-
ary scientific evidence that caring makes a difference. New York:
Studen GR.
Tsering, G. T. (2008). The awakening mind: The foundation of buddhist
thought (Vol. 4). London: Wisdom publications.
Valk, S. L., Bernhardt, B. C., Trautwein, F. M., Böckler, A., Kanske, P.,
Guizard, N., Collins, D. L., & Singer, T. (2017). Structural plasticity
of the social brain: differential change after socio-affective and cog-
nitive mental training. Science Advances, 3(10), e1700489.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Mindfulness
